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The Global Community, Religion, and Education: 
The Modernity of Dewey's Social Philosophy 
DANIEL TROHLER 
University of Zurich, Switzerland 
Abstract. As a starting point his paper takes Dewey's nowadays often stressed modernity and 
examines his social philosophy against the background of the current debates on republicanism and 
communitarianism. Particularly, the anaysis of Dewey's The Public and its Problem (1927) concludes 
that he attention being paid to Dewey is problematic asspecific religious assumptions - explicitly 
developed in A Common Faith (1934) -lie in the background of his social philosophy, and are hardly 
being recognized. However, as it shall be shown, without considering the religious basis, neither 
Dewey's social philosophy nor his educational theory can be properly understood. 
One glance at recent literature reveals John Dewey's popularity. This can be 
shown not only in quantitative terms 1 but also from the judgements passed on 
his views, and particularly from the judgement that Dewey's social philosophy is 
modem.  Robert B. Westbrook (1991) perceives in Dewey's participative definition 
of democracy an important background element in the "New Left" in its struggle 
against "corporate liberalism", whilst Steven C. Rockefeller (also 1991) empha- 
sises how modern Dewey's religious humanism was. Alan Ryan believes he has 
found important clues in Dewey's work for a better definition of the individual. 
Dewey is not only being praised in America for his modernity, but also in Europe] 
The most prominent example of this is surely an article that appeared recently 
from Axel Honneth, who argues in favour of this American writer's definition of 
democracy - "democracy as reflective co-operation" - as opposed to a polarised 
debate on the normative basis of democracy, and regards it as a fertile alternative. 
The ideas presented here are intended to investigate critically the validity of 
the assertion that Dewey is so very modern by analysing democracy as he uses 
the term particularly in "The Public and its Problems" ([PP] 1927). They lead to 
the conclusion that the attention currently being paid to Dewey is problematic as 
religious assumptions lie in the background of his social philosophy which not only 
affect his definition of democracy but greatly influenced his idea of education, and 
that these assumptions are receiving scant attention from the so-called "experts". 
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1. The Common Point of Departure: Crisis Diagnosis and Criticism of 
Liberalism 
The numerous references to Dewey have not come about by accident. They 
are based on a comprehensive crisis diagnosis of the Western world, or to use 
Taylor's expression "The Malaise of Modernity" (Taylor, 1991). This phenomenon 
is nothing new; on the contrary, it reappears egularly. Awareness of extensive polit- 
ical, social, or moral crises has throughout history led to the search and stylisation 
either of a new ideal situation - the best example of this is Rousseau - or of ideal 
persons and concepts uch as the Pestalozzi renaissance after the Second World 
War. 3 Alan Ryan recognised this when he defined the prime reason for the Dewey 
renaissance as being the reawakening of public interest in moral and political 
theory with a community orientation. The starting-off point for this renaissance 
of interest in the community, according to him, had been the sociological studies 
by Bellah of the confused moral state of the average American (Bellah, 1985), 
contaminated as it was by a hybrid of "individualism" (Ryan, 1995, p. 23). This is 
the direction in which Rockefeller's motive for propagating. Dewey lies: "It seems 
that the time is right for giving Dewey a fresh hearing. Ours is a time of moral 
confusion, spiritual search, and crises in the relation of civilisation and nature . . . "  
(Rockefeller, 1991, pp. X et seq.). 
Dewey wrote "The Public and its Problems" on the basis of a comparable crisis 
diagnosis in the 1920s. His immediate r ason for doing so was Walter Lippmann's 
"The Phantom Public", which appeared in 1925, in which Lippmann, like Dewey, 
had started from the assumption that democracy was dependent on a functioning 
public. Historical analysis brought him to the conclusion that during the course 
of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century the public had disappeared and 
given way to a large number of particulate publics, with the result hat it was now 
impossible to retain the idea of democracy orrule by the people. In the same year, 
Dewey published a review of this book in which he basically endorsed Lippmann's 
criticism of the current heories of democracy (Dewey, 1925), and in the following 
year he held a series of lectures in Kanyon College in Ohio which resulted ayear 
later in his book "The Public and its Problems" ([PP] 1927). His intention in this 
book was to reconstruct the state of the many publics and to indicate a route that 
would lead away from this "state of degeneration", which was affecting the whole 
of society. The focus of his criticism was on the one hand modem individualism 
and thus also liberalism, and on the other hand the lack of public transparency. 
1.1. CRITICISM OF INDIVIDUALISM 
Dewey's ociological definition for describing his day and age as a "state of degen- 
eration" was the "Great Society". Its central characteristics are the ideology of 
individualism, the dominance of capitalism, the uniformity of human beings, and 
the loss of the public, all of which are connected with one another and, paradoxi- 
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cally enough, have their origins in the endeavours of the 17th and 18th centuries to 
establish democracy. 
In order to understand this apparent paradox, it is necessary to understand 
Dewey's historical reconstruction f democracy, in which the concept of the public 
plays a fundamental role. In this, he uses a definition of the "public" taken from 
behavioural theory: as soon as an action between two people has consequences for 
others who were not directly involved in it, these other people obviously have an 
interest in the action in which they were not involved. It is this "indirect" effect 
that originally creates the "public character" of an action. The interest created in 
the people affected who were not directly involved leads to two possible reactions: 
a strengthening .reaction if they are in favour of the consequences, or a restrictive 
reaction if they are opposed to them ([PP] pp. 64 et seq.). It was on this basis that 
Dewey formulated his fundamental hypothesis: "Those indirectly and seriously 
affected for good or for evil form a group distinctive nough to require recogni- 
tion and a name. The name selected is The Public" ([PP] p. 35). This public, in 
Dewey's view, however, is not an amorphous mass which can articulate its views 
spontaneously but is an effective institution organised through representatives, the 
result of human reason as "a matter of adaptation of means to consequences" ([PP] 
p. 57). Looked at historically, the public forms a reasonable means for exerting 
influence on non-democratic govemments. 
Dewey's historical reconstruction of the origins of the public is accompanied 
by the question as to how rulers have been selected at each stage. Originally, he 
explained, the selection of the rulers and their powers and authority was never the 
outcome of any selection procedure based on abstract ideas but was more a matter 
of chance. Holders of office were generally speaking never selected on the basis 
of their specific suitability but on the basis of privileges. The examples Dewey 
cited were the gerontocracies, in which people ruled who had been entrusted with 
government business olely on the basis of their age and experience: "Those who 
were already conspicuous in some respect, were it only for long grey beards, had 
political powers conferred upon them" ([PP] p. 78); or in other cases, governments 
were formed from soldiers because people believed that "the ability of a man to win 
battles has seemed to mark him out as a predestined manager of the civil affairs of 
a community" ([PP] p. 79). 4 One feature common to all these types of government, 
he pointed out, was that they turned into dynasties: "Beati possidentes. The family 
from which a ruler has been taken occupies in virtue of that fact a conspicuous 
position and superior power" ([PP] p. 80). This dynastic element, in turn, brought 
about a favouritism economy and led to a situation in which positions of power 
were misused for private purposes. "The centralisation and scope of functions 
which are needed in order to serve the interests of the public become, in other 
words, seductions to draw state officials to subserving private ends" ([PP] p. 81). 
At this point in historical development, a movement now set in which ultimately 
led to democracy. Out of fear that the rulers were misusing power in a manner 
that was illegitimate in terms of the public interest, the need was awakened to 
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limit the scope of their power. At this point, Dewey's argumentation becomes 
particularly important: he states that this movement did not arise from "theories 
of the individual and his rights", but that it was the inevitable outcome of "a vast 
series of adaptations and responsive accomodations" ([PP] p. 84 et seq.) which 
could not even happen until the public had come to realise that it was a public. 
"Political democracy has emerged as a kind of net consequence ofa vast multitude 
of responsive adjustments o a vast number of situations, no two of which were 
alike, but which tended to converge to a common outcome" ([PP] p. 84). 
Following this route, Dewey defined the state as an institution which is consti- 
tuted by the public and organised by officials with their specific power and 
authority. "A public articulated and operating through representative officers is the 
state; there is no state without a government, but also there is none without he 
public" ([PP] p. 67). The idea of the state as something in its own fight or that it 
could be the revelation of a general will or general reason is illusory ([PP] p. 68). 
The state is the product of the development of human association and can take 
on various different forms, all according to the natural or material circumstances 
surrounding it, for which reason there can never be any theory of "The" state ([PP] 
p. 8), nor can it ever have any single correct form ([PP] pp. 32 et seq.). Accordingly, 
the theoretician's problem is not the "discovery of the state" but "the practical 
problem of people living together". The development into a state primarily results 
from working on Nature, developing the appropriate aids, and creating an exchange 
of views between individual communities. Other professions and occupations arise, 
all according to the natural basis of the original community, and further develop- 
ments arise from them in turn. "Roughly speaking, tools and implements determine 
occupations, and occupations determine the consequences of associated activity. 
In determining consequences, they institute publics with different interests, which 
exact different types of political behavior to care for them" ([PP] pp. 44 et seq.). 
Dewey's theory of freedom as an evolutionary eaction to suppression is the key 
to understanding his criticism of individualism and thus also liberalism. As he was 
well aware, it contradicted the general and widely recognised theory that freedom is 
a purpose in itself and is based on a natural state of mankind. According to Dewey, 
however, this thesis is not only wrong but has also had fatal consequences in 
history. The mistake lies in the basic assumption that human beings can be regarded 
as having been presocial from the start, and this has been fatal because this mistake 
was made at exactly the point in time when the practical movement for limiting 
illegitimate government power needed theoretical rguments: in the practical battle 
against political rulers, meaning in the public's constitutional process, people tried 
theoretically, by means of a "return to the naked individual", to dissolve all associ- 
ative bonds or at least only to permit hose that the individual was willing to accept 
of his own free will and ensured that he could attain his own private objectives ([PP] 
p. 88). This "ideology of individualism" ultimately led to a situation in which the 
purpose of political domination was limited simply and solely to protecting those 
individual's rights to which he is allegedly entitled by Nature, and this created the 
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basis for the ideology of liberalism and the theory of the so-called "night-watchman 
state") This ideology found its clearest expression i the French Revolution, which 
abolished all associations and - theoretically atleast - brought he plain individual 
face to face with the state. According to Dewey, this commonly accepted approach 
to an explanation is wrong. The occurrence of the Revolution as such cannot be 
explained in this view, because it does not envisage any appropriate consideration 
of economic and scientific development or applied technology. The true causes in 
fact lay in the industrialisation f economic life in the 18th century, which created 
both new and powerful social conditions and also individual personal opportunities 
and needs which had been very largely suppressed by French economic policy. As 
a result, fear of the government and a desire to limit its claims to power had been 
enormously reinforced, and it was this that had ultimately led to violent rebellion 
([PP] pp. 89 et seq.). 
It is at this point that it first becomes necessary to review the idea that Dewey 
is modem, because there is no escaping the point that his crisis diagnosis is very 
largely in line with the theoretical rguments used today by communitarists, and it 
is this that makes these people's references to him so illuminating. A book which 
appeared in 1982, Michael J. Sandel's "Liberalism and the Limits of Justice", 
pointed the way ahead for these theoretical arguments between communitarianism 
and political liberalism. The main subject-matter of this book is John Rawls' 
"Theory of Justice" (1971), a work that Sandel regards as representing the central 
new foundation for political liberalism. Basically, Sandel's aim is to show that 
Rawls' approach contains fundamental contradictions which demolish the whole 
theoretical building (Sandel, 1982, p. 46). The focal point of this criticism is Rawls' 
hypothetical construction of the "original situation". The main features of this is 
that human beings search for the basic principles of justice that enable them to 
live together, so that each individual can pursue his own aims in life. The mental 
experiment thus provides for the participating persons to be placed behind a "veil 
of ignorance", meaning they are aware neither of their own social position nor of 
their private aims in life. Rawls now assumes that this is a "fair" situation and 
that accordingly the principles of justice on which the participants agree will also 
be basically fair: "justice as fairness". With this in mind, Rawls now looks for 
principles of justice that take precedence over all attributes and tries to establish 
them on a legal basis; Rawls thus places justice ahead of the good. 
The point here is neither to substantiate each of Sandel's arguments individually 
nor to examine the stringency of his argumentation. The interesting aspect here 
is one of the central points of criticism that can be raised particularly against 
two related assumptions that Rawls applies: firstly, that justice is the primary 
social virtue ("primacy of justice"), and secondly that fight takes precedence over 
the good ("priority of right"). The basis of his argumentation strategy, concen- 
trating though on contradictions, i  the reconstruction f Rawls' more implicit han 
explicit philosophical nthropology as the basis of the experiment in the "original 
situation" (see p. 60); by assuming, even if only hypothetically, that there is an 
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"original situation", he implies a definition of the human being as possessing an 
identity which is independent of and precedes his objectives and attributes. "The 
antecedent unity of the self means that the subject, however heavily conditioned 
by his surroundings, i  always, irreducibly, prior to his values and ends, and never 
fully constituted by them" (p. 22). The aims and attributes which characterize a 
human being, this argument goes, are thus not constitutive lements of the self 
but are possessed by the self. "To assert he priority of the self whose sovereign 
agency is assured, it was necessary to identify an 'essentially unencumbered' self, 
conceived as a pure subject of possession, distinct from its contingent aims and 
attributes, tanding always behind them" (p. 121). On the one hand, Sandel now 
proves that any such self must be aware of itself in order to be able to discover 
what separates it from the contingent attributes and objectives (pp. 55 et seq.), but 
that this is not possible because this assumption turned it into an individual before 
it existed and therefore has no reflection facility at all - quite unlike human beings, 
who form their identity through reflection of the empirical course through life (see 
pp. 152 et seq.). However, if on the other hand it is not clear who is acting in the first 
place, and if moreover no reasons exist to show why human beings keep to these 
rules on their empirical course through fife, Rawls' approach becomes obsolete, 
unless he contradicts his own basic assumption and admits that jointly held values 
exist a priori which endow the human being firstly with identity and secondly with 
guarantees (pp. 150 and 156). Then, however, justice can no longer be regarded as 
the primary social virtue ("primacy of justice"), and fight cannot be placed ahead 
of the good ("priority of right"). Consequently, the book ends, after explanations of
further arguments, 6 with the conclusion that a deontologist concept such as Rawls 
attempted toderive from Kant must fail on account of the very premises on which 
it is built (pp. 175 et seq.; see also Sandel, 1984, pp. 82 et seq.). 7
Communitarist criticism not only restricts itself to the theoretical premises of 
liberalism but also turns to the specific moral situation of the Americans which 
has been indicated to be the fatal consequence of their theoretical prescriptions. 
This attribution of the problems of social practice to theoretical prescriptions, 
however, itself creates problems, as both Taylor (1989) and Walzer (1990) have 
noted. Nevertheless, it appears to be popular within communitafianism and can also 
be found in Dewey's work, at least to the extent hat it is unclear whether and to 
what extent he attributes individualism as a specific life-form to the false ideology 
of individualism. In any case, Dewey very much takes the fact into account hat, 
in connection with the establishment of democracies such as American society, 
the foundations of their own destruction are already laid, as is expressed later in a 
uniform mass society dominated by capitalism. Individualism and the uniformity 
of the masses appear to him to be the two negative sides of one and the same coin: 
degeneration. 
Dewey's argumentation, which regards degeneration asevolutionary and does 
not make any explicit reference to the ideology of individualism, runs as follows: 
the success for the established political, social, and economic structures in the 
THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION 165 
young America laid down "channels" through which "non-political, industrialised 
currents" ([PP] p. 114) flowed which to a very large extent changed communal 
social life. Dewey regards these "channels" as including railways, the media, 
transport, and trade. These achievements, in his view, may have initially made it 
possible for the state to spread itself out over an enormous area, because itprovided 
the facilities for creating "sufficient similarities in the ideas and feelings" of the 
multi-cultural immigrants, o that the state was retained and old assumptions were 
punished as lies which had asserted that a democratic state should only be smaller 
and ethnic, but this development, however admirable it may have been, did also 
have the disadvantage of making communal human life uniform and mechanised, 
and it was this that ultimately led to the loss of the public. According to Dewey, the 
process of national integration could never have been the result of any deliberate 
action. "Mechanical forces have operated, and it is no cause for surprise if the effect 
is more mechanical than vital" ([PP] p. 115). A political unity thus created had its 
price, namely that of "social and intellectual uniformity". This uniformity is not to 
be regarded as the same as the "shared goals" of a society, but is the expression 
of this process of reducing everything to a mass. "Mass production is not confined 
to the factory" ([PP] p. 116), but permeates the entirety of social life, which is 
increasingly determined by economic onsiderations and regards its highest aim as 
being "prosperity" (p. 118). 
The inability of the public to regard itself as such is due primarily to the 
developing economy, which has taken on forms that hardly anyone can understand 
any more and has started to manipulate human beings through "salaried opinion- 
formers" for its own purposes. These had grown accustomed, emotionally and 
intellectually, tothe conditions of mass-society, but were afraid of them in matters 
of their direct concern. These anxieties are rationalised out of existence, which 
leads to the sanctified ogmas of established institutions uch as the Constitu- 
tion, the Supreme Court of Justice, and private property. This dogmatic state of 
"social awareness" results on the one hand from the division of science into inde- 
pendent disciplines, screened off from one another, such as anthropology, history, 
sociology, ethics, economics, and political science, all of which more or less relate 
only to themselves. This phenomenon i cludes on the other hand the artificial 
separation of "science" from the "arts", as a reflection of the unreal dichotomy 
between "applied" and "pure" science, and, as Dewey goes on to argue, this divorce 
is connotated with values to such an extent hat every kind of knowledge desig- 
nated as "pure" is contemplated with awe, whereas "applied" knowledge asily 
attracts contempt. Both, he claims, have fatal consequences. On the one hand, the 
developing applied sciences can now only be understood by specialists, and on the 
other hand the further egulation of human affairs is continuing in an "unplanned, 
prejudiced, and unfair" manner because the alternatives to (applied) science are 
"ignorance, prejudice, class-interest, and accident" ([PP] p. 174). The senseless 
attempt to solve human problems by applied science has led to a situation in which 
the "physical sciences" now dominate human affairs, and do so in the interests 
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not of social justice or democracy but of "an owning, profit-hungry class". Shared 
knowledge, which is not only incomplete but also artificial, "has played its part in 
generating enslavement of men, women, and children in factories in which they are 
animated machines to tend inanimate machines" ([PP] p. 175). 
Such communitarian criticism which relates less to the theoretical premises 
of present-day individualism than to the social condition of desolidarisation, the 
collapse of values, and the crisis of identity and of sense in the modern Western 
world considered inits totality, can relate to Dewey, as does the theoretical criticism 
of communitarianism. This can be made particularly clear by taking as an example 
the perhaps best-known of all those present-day critics whose orientation is mainly 
practical, the sociologist Robert N. Bellah, who with his team in 1985 published 
a (first) best-seller under the title of "Habits of the Heart". This starts off from a 
description of America in the early 19th century, as produced by de Tocqueville, 
and follows the degeneration f the communal nd community-supported n twork 
of voluntary social obligations in the Church, the neighbourhood, and the suburb 
so highly praised by this French writer. One of his main points of criticism is the 
dominance of economic thinking in politics, the origin of which lies in the late 19th 
century. "This Neocapitalist vision of national life has its origins in the economic 
and social transformation f the late 19th century. It derives from the creed of busi- 
ness, particularly corporate business, which was able in that era to emancipate itself 
from the strictures of local communities and explicitly to celebrate the flourishing 
of business as the principal means towards a better future" (1985/1996, p. 263). 
It was thus possible to regard it as an all-embracing programme of reform, as 
Bellah says in his 1991 book "The Good Society", which developed precisely in the 
1980s into a new version of the "tyranny of the market": "Belief in the free market 
was revived; the premise of the game of Monopoly was offered with messianic 
expectations such as have seldom been heard since the nineteenth century" (1991, 
p. 90). Bellah considers this to have been so significant because this semi-religious 
view of the economy occurred at a time when progress in the democratic welfare 
state was no longer perceptible and the force of religious and republican language, 
which had diluted the ideology of individualism, had grown weaker. "In a situation 
where further advances in democratic affluence seemed unexpectedly problematic, 
the market metaphor took on singular power. Disillusionment with the welfare 
state, combined with the weakening of the languages of biblical religion and civic 
republicanism that raditionally moderated Locke's individualism, led many to take 
the market maximizer as the paradigm of the human person" (1991, pp. 90 et seq.). 8 
1.2. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE TRANSPARENT PUBLIC 1N MODERN 
MASS-SOCIETY 
Even though cardinal points of criticism in communitarianism tally closely with 
Dewey's analysis, one element is still missing which plays a crucial role in his 
work and also creates problems with references to him, namely the public, or to 
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be more precise the "eclipse of the public". Dewey argues that the ideology of 
the individual, equipped as it is with natural rights, and the trend to uniformity in 
human beings had favoured the new industrial regime, which owed its stability to 
the "new social bonds" which were "as rigid as those which were disappearing and 
much more extensive" ([PP] p. 102). These "powerful, faceless business groups 
and organisations" largely determined "the thoughts, desires, and actions of all", 
and had thus ushered in a "new age of human relationships": impersonal networks 
of relationships which made it impossible for citizens to identify themselves as 
a public ([PP] p. 126). This trend had revealed itself as two-headed: "The same 
forces which have brought about he forms of democratic government.., have also 
brought about conditions which halt the social and humane ideals that demand 
the utilization of government as the genuine instrumentality of an inclusive and 
fraternally associated public" ([PP] p. 109). Whilst industry had developed, the 
development of the corresponding political organs had lagged behind. " 'The new 
age of human relationships' has no political agencies worthy of it. The democratic 
public is still largely inchoate and unorganized" ([PP] p. 109). 
Dewey's crisis diagnosis is very much in line with Lippmann's view that the 
public no longer existed and that it was no longer possible to discern, in this 
mass-society, where this (discursive) public was that people in official positions 
were supposed to be representing. As an expression of this disappearing public, 
Dewey pointed to the rapidly declining number of voters actually going to the 
polls, a consequence of growing apathy in the voting population. This was based 
on the assumption that politicians no longer governed, but that "Big Business" did. 
Regardless of whether or not this assumption was correct, it was certainly true that 
the parties were scarcely capable of producing effective government programmes 
because they were primarily designed to adapt hemselves to social currents ([PP] 
pp. 119 et seq.). This degeneration seemed to be taking on the structure of a 
circulum vitiosus because the lack of understanding onthe part of the public was 
creating a "vacuum" between itself and the government which was being filled by 
"the bosses with their political machines" ([PP] p. 120). The domination of big 
business, with its complex social consequences, was in this view not the cause of 
the eclipse of the public (because this could not understand the structures that had 
now emerged), but was profiting from the gap that had thus opened up between 
the public, which no longer was one, and the government, which consisted of 
representatives of a public that was no longer in office. This makes the situation 
all the more complicated and hard to understand, so that politics in the proper 
meaning of the word was not longer happening. "Political parties may rule, but 
they do not govern. The public is so confused and eclipsed that it cannot even 
use the organs through which it is supposed to mediate political action and polity" 
([PP] p. 121). With regard to the institution of the electoral college, the situation 
today is such that the great mass of voters do not even know the names of its 
members, and the college is thus nothing more than an "impersonal registration 
machine" ([PP] p. 111). The elected government representatives, moreover, had 
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hardly any personal responsibility any more towards the voters at large, because 
they represented an amorphous group, quite apart from the fact that he politicians 
were elected completely at random because of the "apathy" of the public ([PP] 
p. 122). 
The analysis of the eclipse of the public, however, led Dewey to different 
conclusions from those of Lippmann. The match with the diagnosis of the crisis 
leads him to ask about he essential nature of the public and its position in historic 
processes. The two fundamental questions that Dewey asks are: "Is the public a 
myth? Or does it come into being only in periods of marked social transition, 
when crucial altemative issues stand out, such as that between throwing one's 
lot in with the conservation of established institutions or with forwarding new 
tendencies" (p. 123). Dewey answers both questions in the negative; for him, the 
American communities in the 18th century were the specific historical paradigm of 
an existing and functioning public and democracy (see 2) from which he develops 
those elements hat should lead to the restoration of public and democracy (see 3). 
Basically, Dewey sticks to his conviction that, from first principles, a government is 
there "to serve its community", and that his aim can only be met if the community 
itself can choose who is to govern it and what policies they are to pursue. In addi- 
tion to this, he takes the view that such insights, once people have become aware 
of them, will turn into "mature deposits" which will withstand all later crises. This 
conviction is in itself "not a mystic faith" but "a well-attested conclusion from 
historic facts", for which reason "the cure for the ailments of democracy is more 
democracy" ([PP], p. 146). 
2. American Communities as Historical Paradigm 
There is a mental grouping which just on its own will show that, according to 
Dewey, the public, and thus also democracy, is not a myth. The actual historic 
problem of the "Great Society" is, after all, according to Dewey, that it has invaded 
and partially disintegrated the small communities of former times ([PP] p. 127) 
without being able to solve the problems it caused. Dewey's view of these former 
"small communities" took its specific form from the American communities ofthe 
18th century, which represent akind of Golden Age in historical development. 
One prerequisite for a public and democratic state is a relatively complex associ- 
ation of people based on a specialist division of labour. The earliest communities, 
which mainly had to assert hemselves against he vicissitudes of Nature, were 
never able to be states, nor democracies. "Immediate contiguity, face to face rela- 
tionships, have consequences which generate acommunity of interests, a sharing 
of values, too direct and vital to occasion a need for political organization" ([PP] 
p. 39). "With such a condition of intimacy, the state is an impertinence" (p. 41). 
Dewey compares these early communities at the end of a long process of 
development with "genuine" ones which are represented by the public and there- 
fore meet he requirement for establishing themselves as a democratic state, and 
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considers that the establishment of the United States by the colonies striving 
for independence was the first high-point in the development of a public and of 
democracy, and that the democratic American Constitution is the most visible sign 
that political democracy was asserting itself. It was "developed out of a genuinely 
community life", a community which he also sees in "association i local and small 
centres", dominated in the conditions under which the pioneers lived by agricul- 
tural and craft trades. The specific conditions of the settlers had favoured hard 
work, skill, ingenuity, adaptability, and neighbour-like friendliness. "The town- 
ship or some not much larger area was the political unit, the town meeting the 
political medium, and roads, schools, the peace of the community, were the polit- 
ical objectives" ([PP] p. 111). The state, in his view, was basically nothing more 
than the "sum of such units", and the "national state" was a federation of smaller 
states. "The imagination of the founders did not travel far beyond what could be 
accomplished and understood in a congeries of self-governing communities" ([PP] 
p. 111). 
The description of the state of affairs during the period of the establishment of 
the American ation seems at first sight to fit in with the arguments of present-day 
communitarians, and to endow their references to Dewey with additional legit- 
imacy. However, quite apart from the fact that for Dewey a communal public is 
the foundation of democracy - an element that is not all that easy to find with the 
communitarians - it is also possible to find theory elements of republicanism in
Dewey's description, which should not be hastily muddled up with communitari- 
anism, even though both stand in opposition to liberalism. 9 These elements are now 
to be examined more closely, even if at present no representative of republicanism 
has (so far) based his arguments explicitly on those of Dewey. l~ 
Dewey's description of the creation of democracy, which he defines in its 
oppositional character as "liberation from oppression and tradition" ([PP] p. 86), 
already finds its equivalent in present-day republicanism research, l! Also, without 
naming the central term by its name, he describes a state of affairs, dominated by 
cronyism and the kleptocracy of dynastic forms of government, which in republi- 
canism is called "corruption".12 This accusation of corruption is closely linked with 
Dewey's rejection of luxury, which is shown in "Democracy and Education" to be 
a consequence of despotism, the criticism of which belongs to the repertoire of 
republican rhetoric. Because despotism, in Dewey's view, and its anti-egalitarian 
structure hinders the free and mutual interchange between human beings on the 
basis of an equal partnership, leads to privation in the lower classes, whilst its 
consequence in the upper classes is moral decay: "Their culture tends to be sterile, 
to be turned back to feed on itself; their art becomes a showy display and artifi- 
cial; their wealth luxurious, their knowledge over-specialised, and their manners 
fastidious rather than humane" ([DE] p. 84 - see also pp. 119 and 313 et seq.). 
This stand-point is very much in line with that of Rousseau. In his public reply 
to a treatise by Charles Bordes, who in 1751 had rejected Rousseau's Th~se des 
premiers discours and had emphasised the positive importance of luxury, wrote to 
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the great man of Geneva: "Luxury can be necessary in order to provide the poor 
with bread; but, if there were no luxury, there would not be any poor people. It 
occupies idle citizens" (Rousseau, 1752/1964, p. 79). 
The example of the electoral college in the political system of the American 
communities will perhaps best serve to show the extent o which Dewey's analysis 
of the democratic freedom movement conforms with the republicanism of the 18th 
century. The appointment ofan electoral college to decide on the holders of office, 
in Dewey's view, in fact required the citizens to know the candidates personally 
and to elect those who were known for "uprightness", "public spirit", and "knowl- 
edge"; the virtue of the members of the electoral college was to be the guarantee 
for policies that were really devoted to the affairs and interests of the public. This 
theoretical model corresponds toa large extent to Rousseau's republican ideal in his 
"Social Contract" (1762), according to which a nation is fit - among other things -
for just laws if it is not too large. "What nation is fit for legislation? (.. .) The one 
in which each member can be known to all the others" (2nd Book, 10th Chapter; 
(EC II, p. 390). Rousseau specifies precisely, in the chapter on democracy, that this 
form of state is only possible if all the people in it can meet within a short time 
and can know one another, 13 and if virtue - a point derived from Montesquieu's 
definition of a republic in "The Spirit of Laws" (1748) - stands at the centre: "That 
is why a famous author has given virtue as the principle to the republic; because 
none of these conditions could exist without virtue" (3rd Book, 4th Chapter, (EC 
III, p. 405). 14 
Looked at historically, the coincidence between republicanism and Dewey's 
reconstruction of the origins of democracy in America is no accident, and is 
confirmed by the latest literature. John Pocock, in "The Machiavellian Moment" 
(1975), has demonstrated that the period in which the United States were being 
founded were dominated far less than had previously been thought by liberal than 
by republican motives. "The American Revolution, which to an older school of 
historians eemed a rationalist or naturalist breach with an old world and its history, 
now appears to have been involved in a complex relation both with English and 
Renaissance cultural history and with a tradition of thought which had from its 
beginnings confronted political man with his own history and was, by the time of 
the Revolution, being used to express an early form of the quarrel with modernity", 
p. 506). Pocock shows that, in the middle of the 18th century in America, English 
republicanism was particularly virulent. The prime movers behind English republi- 
canism since the end of the 18th century had been on the one hand the Dissenters, 
many of whom emigrated to America, and in particular to New England, where 
Dewey grew up, and on the other hand republicanism was promoted by radical 
Whigs who pursued the ideal of the "landed man" - the wealthy land-owner - in 
dealing with the commercial trends of the Court Whigs, meaning a person who 
in the republican manner is not corrupted by any capitalistic greed and, because 
of his secure income, can devote himself totally to the general well-being. This 
is an ideal that was to be found more often in Virginia and the other southern 
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Colonies than in the north. "The Whig canon and the neo-Harringtonians, Milton, 
Harrington and Sidney, Trenchard, Gordon and Bolingbroke, together with the 
Greek, Roman, and Renaissance masters of the tradition as far as Montesquieu, 
formed the authortafive literature of this culture; and its values and concepts were 
those with which we have grown familiar - a civic and patriot ideal in which 
the personality was founded in property, perfected in citizenship but perpetually 
threatened by corruption" (p. 507). 
3. The Restoration of Democracy Through the "Great Community" 
Dewey showed, in his analysis of the American communities, that "the public" is 
not a myth. The second question he had to answer was whether it is merely a histor- 
ical phenomenon rone that only makes its appearance in times of crisis. Basically, 
he looked round for possible ways in which the ideal that he saw in the American 
communities could be created under the conditions of a modem market economy, 
the consequences of which he regarded as degeneration. The terminological course 
of this programme is prescribed in advance: Dewey was looking for possible ways 
of turning the "Great Society" into a "Great Community", and here the great intel- 
lectual problem was to find the means by which this mobile and manifold public 
could recognise itself again, as it could thus and only thus become a true public. 
This "search for conditions under which the Great Society could become the Great 
Community" (p. 147) was Dewey's prospective goal, and this may have revealed 
him to be evolutionistic, but not deterministic. The "technological ge" is a phase 
people must go through in order that they may be ultimately able to be "absorbed 
into a humane age" on the basis of material security (p. 217). The analysis of 
the means that Dewey refers to in "The Public and its Problems" shows that both 
republican and communitarian matters do still exist but have now been joined by 
universal dimensions which call them into question. The resultant contradiction is 
not resolved until we come to Dewey's definition of religion (see 4). 
3.1. COMMUNICATIONS 
The third phase in the reconstruction of democracy is mainly normative in char- 
acter, i.e. it is a desideratum (see [PP] p. 143). It is fitting that Dewey refers 
increasingly to an "idea" of democracy that is to be analysed here - "Regarded 
as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It 
is the idea of community life itself (...). Only when we start from a community as 
a fact, grasp the fact in thought so as to clarify and enhance its constituent elements, 
can we reach an idea of democracy which is not utopian" - and which is capable 
of making sense of the three central slogans of the French Revolution (which were 
so distorted at the time by the ideology of individualism): "Fraternity, liberty, and 
equality isolated from communal life are hopeless abstractions" ([PP] pp. 148 et 
seq.). 
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The central characteristic of the community is communications, through which 
it creates apublic. Community and public can be said to exist when, firstly, people 
act in concert, secondly, all involved are aware of the consequences of these actions 
and accept hem as being good, and thirdly, this "good" stimulates all involved to 
exert great effort to retain this "good" because it is shared by all of them. "The 
clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea 
of democracy" ([PP] p. 149). Dewey emphasises that on the other hand mere asso- 
ciative action still does not signify a community, because this requires the concepts 
of "we" and "our". "Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are 
appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the 
realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain 
it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community" 
(p. 149, and see p. 152). Public, community, and democracy all necessarily require 
communications, the exchange of signs and symbols as the means of looking upon 
joint activities from without. 
3.2. KNOWLEDGE 
"The ultimate harm is that the understanding by man of his own affairs and 
his ability to direct them are sapped at their root when knowledge of nature is 
disconnected from its human function" ([PP] p. 176). Dewey therefore pleads for 
continuous social research to provide the public with information about he present- 
day conditions of associated life. Public opinion can only be created when people 
are informed about facts: "... genuinely public policy cannot be generated unless it 
be informed by knowledge, and this knowledge does not exist except when there is 
systematic, thorough, and well-equipped search and record" ([PP] pp. 178 et seq.). 
The production of knowledge that makes ense to the community overcomes the 
division between "pure" and "applied", because this is ultimately the expression of 
a non-democratic social structure. The rejection of "applied" sciences originated 
with the Greeks of antiquity, where the definition of knowledge was itself an 
expression of social reality, an image of the master-and-slave society in which only 
the latter worked whilst the former sought human value in contemplation ([DE] 
pp. 228 et seq.). This "humanism", according to Dewey, continued right up until 
modern times, and even up to a time in which technology was being dynamised 
by science and thus making democracy possible. It would thus appear necessary to 
assume "that natural science is more humanistic than an alleged humanism which 
bases its educational schemes upon the specialized interests of a leisure class" 
([DE] p. 229). 
The creation of knowledge is only the one problem, and the dissemination 
of knowledge is the other. Dewey opposes the often expressed view that people 
in general had no interest in the results of social research and could for that 
reason never form a public nor establish a democracy. Although he recognised 
the problem, he accuses ceptics of not taking the power of art into account ([PP] 
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p. 183). He admitted that it was correct o state that scientific journals in which 
the results of the research were presented could hardly have any widespread effect, 
but the substance of these research studies was of "such great and broad human 
significance" that it would be very attractive to artists to spread this knowledge 
amongst the populace at large. "This process is art. Poetry, the drama, the novel, are 
proofs that the problem of presentation is not insoluble. Artists have always been 
the real purveyors of news, for it is not the outward happening in itself which is 
new but the kindling by it of emotion, perception, and appreciation" ([PP] p. 184). 
3.3. PLURALITY AND HOLISTIC DEVELOPMENT 
The problem, in Dewey's view, is not that the public no longer exists but that 
too many of them exist. "There is too much public, a public too diffused and 
scattered and too intricate in composition" ([PP] p. 137); the public has thus 
become "amorphous and unarticulated" ([PP] p. 131). Whilst he places a negative 
value on plurality of publics, and tries to overcome it with knowledge, art, and 
communications, heon the other hand places positive value on the cultural plur- 
ality. This can be shown by an example that, quite deliberately, addresses a subject 
relevant o educational science: Dewey said that a member of a gang of robbers 
would only be promoted in those "potentialities" that were useful to the gang, 
whilst his other abilities would necessarily ie fallow. A "good citizen", on the other 
hand, would be a member of a number of groups, such as his family, the general 
economy, and scientific or artistic associations. As in the gang of robbers, these 
groupings promote the potentialities in each of the people belonging to them that 
are important to that particular group, but, by participating in a number of different 
groupings and exchanging knowledge and ideas with them, citizens can develop 
"holistically": "fullness of integrated personality is therefore possible of achieve- 
ment, since the pulls and responses of different groups reinforce one another and 
their values accord" ([PP] p. 148). 
Dewey emphasises that an individual can never be set up in opposition to an 
association of which he or she is an integral part. One person might be an individual 
in a church community, another in his or her place of work, and the differences are 
perfectly easy to accept hat arise from the fact that the one has nothing to do with 
the other. However, they could set off an inner conflict, and that would in turn 
lead to "the" abstract individual being totally separated from "the" abstract society 
and thus to a "residual individual" being designed who only belonged to himself. 
"From this premise, and from this only, there develops the unreal question of how 
individuals come to be united in societies and groups: the individual and the social 
group are now opposed to each other, and there is the problem of 'reconciling' 
them" ([PP] p. 191). Dewey is concerned with the specific individual and the 
specific society: "To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take 
of communication a  effective sense of being an individually distinctive member 
of a community" ([PP] p. 154). The emphasis lies here both on "member of a 
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community" and on "individual". The "nature of the democratic idea in its general 
social sense" consists of two dimensions: looking from the point of view of the 
individual this idea means, on the one hand, making the largest possible contri- 
bution to the formation and management of those groups to which one belongs, 
and on the other hand participating in their values whenever necessary. This also 
means, from the groups' side, on the one hand "liberating" the individual abilities 
of the members and on the other hand bringing them into concordance with the 
"communal interests and goods". 
It is in this double aspect of harmoniously shaped individuals and communities 
that the moral value of democracy can be found, as Dewey had emphasised 
in "Education and Democracy". When (...) democracy has a moral and ideal 
meaning, it is that a social j5 return to be demanded from all and that opportunity 
for development of distinctive capacities be afforded all. The separation of the two 
aims in education is fatal to democracy" ([DE] p. 122). 
3.4. STRENGTHENING THE FACE-TO-FACE SOCIETY 
The Great Community distinguishes itself from the Great Society by the free 
and mutual communications between informed people, who thus form a public 
and regulate the relationships between local associations and enrich their experi- 
ence. The Great Community, however, does not possess the qualities of the local 
communities, which can communicate face-to-face and thus generate a genuine 
pedagogic atmosphere, thus becoming the sine qua non of the humanisation that 
this process is striving to achieve. This inherent quality results in family and neigh- 
bourhood always having remained "the chief agencies of nurture" ([PP] p. 211) 
because they represent the genuine means through which attitudes are formed and 
ideas acquired, and these in turn set their roots in the character of a person. For 
this reason, Dewey pleads for the "restoration" of the communities destroyed by 
the Great Society, because he considers that there is no alternative to the vitality 
and depth of close and direct communications: firstly, the direct experience of a 
bond of neighbourly association is able to generate love and understanding for 
human beings: "Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighbourly 
community" ([PP] p. 213). "Community" and "communal ctivities" would thus 
become "words to conjure with"; the "local is the ultimate universal" ([laP] p. 215), 
and Dewey believed that the future of democracy in any case depends on the 
restoration of the small communities. "Unless local communal life can be restored, 
the public cannot adequately resolve its most urgent problem: to find and identify 
itself" ([PP] p. 216). All the same, Dewey defines "restoration" ot so much in 
the nostalgic sense of recreating something that has passed away, because with the 
globalisation of research and the artistic communication f this knowledge to the 
global public on the one hand, and the plurality of communities on the other, people 
now have vastly greater opportunities than anyone had ever had in the 18th century. 
"But if it [the local communal life, DT] be reestablished, it will manifest a fullness, 
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variety and freedom of possession and enjoyment of meanings and goods" of which 
even the local communities of the past remained in ignorance. "While local, it will 
not be isolated" ([PP] p. 216). Dewey regards the reason for this as being in the 
enrichment of the local community through its communicative participation i the 
(world-wide) Great Community. This means that the communicative exchange of 
ideas and knowledge does not stop when it comes to a national frontier; territorial 
states hould not be allowed to be barriers causing an impoverishment of exper- 
ience and of this exchange. The world-wide communications e tablished by the 
Great Community overcome political frontiers to the outside world which would 
create "jealousy, fear, suspicion, and hostility" on the inside ([PP] p. 217). 
4. The Religious and Pedagogic Basis 
On the basis of these facts, Axel Honneth, in the essay mentioned above, comes to 
the conclusion that Dewey's theory of democracy is superior to two other models of 
democracy currently under discussion and are being fielded against liberalism (and 
its negative consequences). Both these models, over which Dewey is being given 
preference, are designated by Honrieth - somewhat confusingly, but on account of 
his having derived them from Habermas - as "proceduralism" and "republicanism" 
(1999, p. 37), 16 both of which aim in their different ways at more democratic 
participation than "actually happens in political iberalism" (p. 38). Both models 
are said to derive from Dewey, which might be understandable but is inappro- 
priate, because they each only share one side of Dewey's approach, whilst Honneth 
himself tries to bring these two sides together (pp. 40 et seq.): the reflective process 
and democratic deliberation on the one hand, political community and communal 
goals on the other (p. 41). The main reason for which Dewey can be distinguished 
from the two other models (and which guides Honneth's argumentation) is that he 
does not take his line from the model of "communicative consultation, but from the 
model of social co-operation" (p. 41). 
Honneth emphasises that Dewey's real strength, compared with the other two 
models - and for different reasons in each case - lies in the fact that he had 
recognised the fundamental significance of specific experience of life in the "sub- 
political association of all citizens" (pp. 58 et seq.). Compared with republicanism, 
in his view, the theoretical support gained from these sub-political areas was 
superior because they enable the realisation to dawn that the human being is 
not only a political animal and that political virtue is not the be-all and end-all. 
Compared with proceduralism, the advantage of taking these fundamental exper- 
iences into account in the communities lies in the fact that it enables human 
co-operation to be learnt, and at the same time enables the unresolved question 
of proceduralism, namely the question of the citizens' motives and interests, to be 
resolved at last. 
Honneth himself alls short of his objective with this interpretation. When he 
tries "to understand democratic morals ... as the outcome of the experience that 
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all members of society could gain with one another if they were only drawn co- 
operatively to one another by a just system of the division of labour" (p. 65, see 
also p. 59), he reduces Dewey to a theory of ethical capitalism. And when he 
attributes "individual freedom" to experience gained "in mutual co-operation", he 
limits the human being to a rational entity. Both reductions miss both the point 
and the complex of problems in "The Public and its Problems", namely that this 
"brotherly" experience in the community involves exactly the experience that goes 
beyond the bounds of the rational and thus gives rise to a deeper educational effect: 
"The connections of the ear with vital and out-going thought and emotion are 
immensely closer and more varied than those of the eye. Vision is a spectator; 
hearing is a participator" ([PP] pp. 218 et seq.). 
Dewey's olution (of which Honneth to some extent attempts to take over the 
defensible part), according to which people are to be led to global communica- 
tions through their day-to-day experience in the face-to-face communities that need 
strengthening politically, begs the inescapable question as to why they should o so, 
which is to a certain extent the motivational level. Honneth's reply, that people learn 
this in the "sub-political areas", is tautological because it does not explain what 
could induce people to break out of the communities that create their identities for 
them and gain knowledge which could wherever possible question their identities 
- and who then nevertheless act in a manner orientated to the communal well- 
being. A similar problem arises at the level of the "sub-political areas" themselves; 
Honneth cannot explain why these communities should not be tempted to gain a 
privileged position over other communities within the state. Thirdly, Honneth does 
not understand what Dewey is talking about when he refers to the sociological 
knowledge that is fundamental todemocracy. Dewey is not only concerned with 
"more ... knowledge" (Honneth, 1999, p. 54) but with "a kind of knowledge and 
insight which does not yet exist" ([PP] p. 166). It can be said to Honneth's credit 
that Dewey did not actually solve these problems 17 in "The Public and its Prob- 
lems"; however, the reduction of the problems to rationality points in exactly the 
opposite direction to the one that Dewey took seven years later, in 1934, when his 
work "A Common Faith" appeared which can be regarded as the solution to these 
problems. 
4.1. THE RELIGIOUS BASIS 
The theoretical problems that result in "The Public and its Problems" can be 
roughly summarised asone core problem: the relationship between the particular 
and the universal. Dewey's axiom, that the local is ultimately the universal, does 
not help to solve the problem, but merely makes it plainer. He needs to be able 
to explain how individual harmony relates to the universality of the local and, in 
turn, with the global dimension of communications, but without having to make 
recourse to any metaphysics, which he rejects just as forcefully as natural law. 18 
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"A Common Faith" is made up of three parts. The first part, "Religion versus 
the Religious", aims at the emancipation of the latter in order to escape from the 
supranaturalism of the religions and thus to identify the religious element in normal 
experience. The second part, "Faith and its Object", shows that in this religious 
element of experience there is always some belief in an ideal, and emphasises that 
the (practical) power of this belief becomes greater when one distances oneself 
completely from supranaturalism. The third part assumes a "mysterious totality of 
all present and future human beings", which is called the "Universe", and places 
value on the fact that the intellect is not capable on its own of understanding this 
"encompassing scope of existence" ([CF] p. 56). 
This third part contains a similar historic reconstruction to that in "The Public 
and its Problems", although the focus is now not on the public as a necessary 
prerequisite for democracy but on religion, although this is likewise ultimately a
necessary prerequisite for democracy. The starting-off point is antiquity, in which 
religion and politics formed one sphere of public life into which every member of 
the community was born and in which and to which each one was brought up ([CF] 
pp. 40 et seq.). This unity of religion and politics, the book says, has been broken 
up during the course of history by the arrival of science and the schism in belief to 
such an extent hat religious life is no longer a constitutive part of the whole but 
a matter for specific institutions, within a secular society, which are dominated by 
numerous non-religious but no less powerful associations ([CF] pp. 40 et seq.). 
A parallel phenomenon, or alternatively an intellectual reflex to this "greatest 
revolution that has ever taken place in religions" was, in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, the idea of natural religion, which on the one hand was directed against 
the ruling institutions but on the other hand still clung to supranaturalism. This 
idea, which is related to that of the "natural man" and "natural law", and arose from 
related structural forces in the same period of time, strengthened the congregation 
and thus weakened the power of the Church within the communal organisations 
([CF] pp. 43 et seq.). The crucial aspects of this new situation were firstly that 
religion became a question for personal decision and secondly that it became 
possible, through the personal attitude of the believer, to take a religious approach 
to secular matters. This possibility went far beyond the bounds of a supranaturally 
orientated Church because it withdrew itself from all those fields in which the 
sciences had taken up occupation and thus had no further influence at all. It is with 
this phenomenon that Dewey emphasises the value of the "religious person" as 
opposed to "religion"; whilst "religion" thus became the expression of institutions 
and ceremonies, the argument went, which represented supranaturalistic eaching 
and appeared plurally in the world, the term "religious" was used to mean an 
attitude mancipated from "religion" and belonging somewhere in between supra- 
naturalism and atheistic materialism. The central position is taken up by religious 
experience as a natural phenomenon, which can turn up in various situations in 
everyday life and possesses a force which creates harmony within the self and 
between the self and the world. "It is sometimes brought about by devotion to a 
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cause; sometimes by a passage of poetry that opens a new perspective; sometimes 
as was the case with Spinoza - deemed an atheist in his day - through philosophical 
reflection" ([CF] p. 11). This kind of experience l ads to a change in the inner atti- 
tude to the world, a change that is far more comprehensive and profound than the 
phenomenon that can be regarded in the Darwinian sense as adaptation to changed 
surroundings and which ultimately "includes a note of submission" ([CF] p. 13). 
This attitude is not caused externally, but willingly, and also not through any one 
specific decision or expression of intent but in relation to a whole: "It is a change of 
will conceived as the organic plenitude of our being, rather than any special change 
in will" ([CF] p. 13). As a result of this, Dewey is able to say: "The conception that 
'religious' signifies a certain attitude and outlook, independent ofthe supranatural, 
necessitates no such division" ([CF] p. 45). Overcoming the dichotomy between 
the supranatural nd the natural, or in other words the emancipation of the "reli- 
gious person" from "religion", is Dewey's key to understanding the human being 
and the world as a totality, because (only) the religious attitude of the human being 
is capable of humanising the secular world. True "good" lies not in the next world 
but within our own experience of the world ([CF] p. 47). 
One of the core terms in this concept is the imagination. Dewey postulated that 
this is the only organ that is capable of "recognising" and creating harmony within 
the self and between the self and the world. "The idea of a whole, whether of the 
whole personal being or of the world, is an imaginative, not a literal, idea. The 
limited world of our observation and reflection becomes the Universe only through 
imaginative xtension. It cannot be apprehended in knowledge, nor realized in 
reflection" ([CF] p. 14). To form the link between ideality and imagination, faith 
takes its place with its moral and practical significance. "Conviction in the moral 
sense signifies being conquered, vanquished, in our active nature by an ideal end" 
([CF] p. 15). If this moral conviction ow wakens feelings which are supported by 
the striving for unity, Dewey claims that "religiousness" will emerge in the sense 
of "morality touched by emotion" ([CF] p. 16), and that this religious attitude will 
determine the quality of the person's ocial and political ife. "The religious attitude 
signifies something that is bound through imagination to a general attitude. (...) 
The quality of attitude is displayed in art, science, and good citizenship" ([CF] 
p. 17). 
This thus creates the link to the subject under discussion here. Science is 
the medium through which knowledge and truth are created, which in turn are 
disseminated through art and discussed iscursively by the citizens. The search for 
knowledge and truth runs through patient, co-operative r search in the sense of 
observation, experiment, and reflection. The outcome of all this does not contra- 
dict religious truths because, with the emancipation of the religious person from 
religion, experience itself becomes the place where "religiousness" happens ([CF] 
p. 23). However, this ideal means that science must divorce itself from "mech- 
anicalism" ([CF] p. 37) in order, firstly, to arrive at a holistic understanding of 
Nature. "The change gives aspiration for natural knowledge a definitely religious 
THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION 179 
character, since growth in the understanding of nature is seen to be organically 
related to the formation of ideal ends" ([CF] p. 38). Secondly, however, the ideal 
can be applied to the social sciences as well, which have up to now only been 
rudimentary in structure ([CF] p. 50) because the ideology of individualism and 
the laissez-faire system ultimately denies the possibility of intelligent intervention 
in human behaviour. The necessary prerequisite is that intelligence has to be seen 
less in connection with the old attitude of reason but much more in connection with 
practice: with feelings. "Moreover, there is no opposition between it and emotion. 
There is such a thing as passionate intelligence, as ardor on behalf of light shining 
into the murky places of social existence, and as zeal for its refreshing and purifying 
effect" ([CF] p. 52). This thus formulates the ideal of the "kind of knowledge and 
insight" that Dewey was calling for in "The Public and its Problems" ([PP] p. 166). 
In this respect, humanity does form a community but one that is constituted 
not by the transcendentally based belief that we are all God's children but by a 
"mysterious totality of being" which one can call the "Universe" ([CF] p. 56). 
This is in line with the anthropological statement that human beings possess, or 
have developed, a facility directed - towards participation and sympathy, justice, 
equality, and freedom ([CF] p. 54). 
In the mutual, co-operative, and discursive xchange of thoughts, people can 
form a "comprehensive community" ([CF] p. 56) which, directly because it has 
overcome the dichotomy and thus both supranaturalism and "mechanicalism", 
meets the requirements for the ideal of democracy. 19 "I cannot understand how 
any realization of the democratic deal as a vital moral and spiritual ideal in human 
affairs is possible without surrender the conception of the basic division to which 
supranatural Christianity is committed" ([CF] pp. 55 et seq.). What is now needed 
is to waken this latent religious faith in people: "Here are the elements for a reli- 
gious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always 
been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and 
militant" ([CF] p. 58). 
4.2. THE PEDAGOGIC DIMENSION 
Under these premises it is easy to understand the lofty position that education and 
training have for the creation, maintenance, and further development of democ- 
racy. The fundamental significance of educational science is thus not limited to the 
institution of the school. Even if Dewey does not himself mention this analogy, he 
does aim towards acertain emancipation for the educational from the institution in 
the same way as in the relationship between religion and religious people. Educa- 
tion must therefore not be delegated, because that would force the fundamental 
pedagogic impetus of life as such out of all other social areas. Dewey may not have 
been aiming for the abolition of schools, but he was looking firstly for a funda- 
mentally new relationship between school and the context of life and secondly for 
a "pedagogisation" of the context of life itself. 
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4.2.1. The pedagogic interpretation of the face-to-face communities 
Strengthening the local communities in connection with the establishment of the 
Great Community is connected with a fundamental pedagogic view in which the 
value of the small, local community is primarily regarded in its educational effect 
on the individual, and is expressly valued as such. Dewey, however, favours neither 
the individual nor the community; he prefers their mutual pedagogic impetus. If 
Dewey had not favoured the principles of pluralism and world-wide communi- 
cations, the pedagogic effect would be asymmetric and the educational concept 
would be similar to that of communitarianism. 2~ However, the principle of plur- 
ality leads a great deal further; together with world-wide communications, it is the 
means by which the individual can be formed holistically. In this respect, Dewey's 
approach aims for an individual who does not represent any contradiction to the 
social context and sees his rights as secured against it, but for one who can only 
come into existence within the social context and is inextricably bound up with it. 
That is why the concept of "co-operation" is wrong in the sense in which Honneth 
uses it; what is involved here is far more a concept of the "constitution". In this 
connection, Dewey's demarcation makes particularly good sense, especially when 
he turns against any organological view of the community as it is encountered often 
enough in communitarianism. Dewey's view is that the human being is probably 
born as an organic being which is connected with others, but not as a member of 
a community. Education becomes a genuine medium through which young people 
can be introduced into the traditions, philosophies, and interests of the community. 
Education therefore means not simply the development of inherent abilities but the 
learning of something specifically human, and that means communication through 
symbols. "The problem of securing diffused and seminal intelligence can be solved 
only to the degree in which local communal life becomes a reality. Signs and 
symbols, language, are the means of communication bywhich a fraternally shared 
experience is ushered in and sustained" ([PP] pp. 217 et seq.). Therefore, one 
particular point in "A Common Faith" takes on a particular pedagogic and moral 
significance which calls for recognition of the fact "that goods actually experienced 
in the concrete relations of family, neighborhood, citizenship, pursuit of art and 
science, and what men actually depend upon for guidance and support, and that 
their reference to a supran'atural and other-worldly ocus has obscured their real 
nature and has weakened their force" ([CF] p. 47). 
4.2.2. The school as a state institution 
The question as to the role of the school is dealt with by Dewey exclusively in 
"Democracy and Education". Although there are problems of interpretation with 
the necessary etrospective iew from 1927 or 1934 back to the work that appeared 
in 1916, it does give it a deeper meaning which Dewey had probably worked out 
for it, as he regarded it as one of his most important ones. From this focus it 
becomes clear that the school, which according to "Democracy and Education" 
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is only necessary in the more highly developed societies whose social heritages 
have become more complex ([DE] p. 19), is in reality a 'continuation' of the 
world of everyday life and has to be directly connected to it. Because, according to 
Dewey, every experience contains religious elements, and school has to be directly 
connected to the living world, school ultimately acquires a religious character. 
Between this universal-harmonious ideal and the fact that schools are organ- 
ised by the state there arises a problem; as a state institution it is in danger of 
conducting citizen-education, as did in fact happen in Germany in the 19th century. 
Dewey derives from this state of affairs one of the basic problems of present-day 
educational science: "One of the fundamental problems of education in and for a 
democratic society is set by the conflict of a nationalistic and a wider social aim" 
([DE] p. 97). The historical problem is articulated in the contradiction that on the 
one hand science, art, and trade (both in their ideal and also in their mechanised 
forms) ignore national frontiers, and on the other hand the political independence 
of states has never been so strongly emphasised. "This contradiction . . . .  exacts of 
educational theory a clearer conception of the meaning of 'social' as a function and 
test of education than has yet been attained" ([DE] p. 97). 
The meaning of "social" becomes clear from the discussion of the "mystic 
totality" of all human beings. The possibility of setting up an education system 
within a national state, the aims of which are not nationally restricted epend, in 
Dewey's view, on two preconditions: firstly, the need to overcome class distinc- 
tions, and secondly the need to reconcile patriotism with cosmopolitanism ([DE] 
pp. 97 et seq.). The first precondition reflects the rejection of any kind of dualism 
that Dewey makes at a number of points and finds its solution in the overcoming 
of the contradiction between pure and applied science and education; the aim is to 
make knowledge, completely divorced from supranaturalism and mechanicalism, 
something that people in their normal circumstances of life can experience, learn, 
discuss, and thus use. The second condition aims to enable "nations to participate 
in shared human aims and objectives regardless of geographical frontiers" (national 
frontiers being of secondary importance). A school designed along these lines is 
"social" because it meets both the necessary requirements of the idea of education 
"as a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social alms" 
([DE] p. 98). 
Looked at this way, the school has three tasks. It must provide a "simpli- 
fied environment" from which the pupils can learn about it. It must exclude 
the influence of valueless and devaluing elements in the existing environment as 
much as possible in order to create "a purified atmosphere of action", so that a 
"better society" can emerge. The definition of "values" is obviously not derived 
from transcendental premises but from the analysis of the conditions that make 
social communication possible. And thirdly, the school is the place in which "the 
various factors in the social surroundings" are balanced off against one another, 
so that "each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of 
the social group into which he was born, and to come into living contact with a 
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broader environment" ([DE] p. 20). The school thus becomes a "prototype of the 
society" that matches Dewey's ideal, so that the "minds" can be shaped which will 
"gradually modify the larger and more recalcitrant features of adult society" ([DE] 
p. 317). 
5. Concluding Comments 
It has been the aim of this investigation to show that the various references to 
Dewey are understandable, but to this extent offer theoretical problems when 
Dewey's central premises are taken out of the picture. This reveals an astounding 
parallel with Rousseau to the extent hat, in light of the irretrievable loss of the 
"golden age" (the American communities), he no longer thinks of a locally limited 
citizen but radically gives preference to the holistically educated person. Whereas 
this option was in Rousseau's "Emile" still the expression of an emphatically 
republican reaction which in the end will largely return, 21 in Dewey it is reli- 
giously inspired evolution: the ideal of the human being holistically educated to 
a totality, not educated outside corrupt society but within strengthened face-to-face 
communities through informed, mutual discourse. Assertions that attribute Dewey 
with modernity must make these facts transparent and validate them critically. They 
would owe that to Dewey's approach. 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to thank Simone Zurbuchen for her critical comments and suggestions. 
Notes 
1 From 1993 to 1999, almost 250 titles appeared in English and German on Dewey's educational 
theories alone. 
2 Please refer to some of the other articles in this book. The entire book as such shows that it is 
regarded as worthwhile to study Dewey in depth. 
3 Both sides will be encountered in this article. Whilst the references toDewey affect him as a person 
and his concepts, Dewey himself (in much the same way as Rousseau) looked back yearningly to an 
earlier "Golden Age". 
a He also cited governments made up of "medicine-men" or "priests". 
5 Following the same lines as the political theory that raises the natural individual to the highest 
level of sovereignty, philosophical knowledge theorists had turned to "the sell  or ego, in the form of 
personal consciousness identified with mind itself" ([PP] p. 83) and thus argued in favour of a very 
effective dualism of mind and world which dominated i eas in educational science for a long time 
(Democracy and Education [DE] 1916, p. 90). 
6 For instance, the major criticism of Rawls definition of community, to which he gives a highly 
individualistic slant in accordance with his theory and consequently assumes co-operation between 
individuals with similar aims and feelings: "Rawls' account is individualistic nthe sense of assuming 
the antecedent individuation of the subject of co-operation, whose actual motivations may include 
benevolent aims as well as selfish ones" (Sandel, 1982, pp. 148 et seq.; see p. 161). Although 
Sandel recognises that Rawls, with his "sentimental conception", goes far beyond the "instrumental 
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conception" which is only based on self-interest, but still does not go far enough, because he cannot 
see that community is a "mode of self-understanding" (p. 150). In this respect, a community in his 
view describes not only "what they have as fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship 
they choose ... but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their 
identity" (p. 150). Only when the individual has been defined in this constituted way can it undertake 
any self-reflection. "But to be capable of a more thoroughgoing reflection [than only perceiving the 
contingent desires and aspirations, DT], we cannot be wholly unencumbered subjects of possession, 
individuated in advance and given prior to our ends, but must be subjects constituted in part by our 
central aspirations and attachments, always open, indeed vulnerable, to growth and transformation in 
the light of revised self-understanding" (p. 172). 
7 Two other aspects are worthy of mention which are in accordance with Dewey's criticism of 
"individualism". The first refers to the high level of attractiveness which Sandel, like Dewey, awards 
to this "ideology". The idea of an individual released from social contexts makes it sovereign, "cast 
as the author of the only moral meanings there are" (Sandel, 1984, p. 87); accordingly, this theory 
is more attractive than tenable. "This is an exhilarating promise, and the liberalism it animates i  
perhaps the fullest expression of the Enlightenment's quest for the self-defining subject. But is it 
true?" (p. 87). This brings us to the second aspect. Like Dewey, Sandel places the origin of the 
"ideology" of individualism in the 17th century, although in this case not for reasons of political 
evolution but because of the development of the free (secular) sciences: "Where neither Nature 
nor cosmos supplies a meaningful order to be grasped or apprehended, it falls to human subjects 
to constitute a meaning on their own. This would explain the prominence of contract theory from 
Hobbes onward, and the corresponding emphasis on voluntarist as against cognitive thics culminat- 
ing in Kant. What can no longer be found remains omehow to be created" (Sandel, 1982, pp. 175 et 
seq.). 
8 In the "Good Society", in 1991, Bellah, following explicitly in the footsteps of Dewey (Bellah, 
1991, p. 305), rejects the view that the old communities should be revived, because, as he says 
even later, such an undertaking would be nostalgic (Bellah, 1998, p. 15). Nevertheless, the question 
remains as to how society can become agood society. The victorious ideology of "ontological indi- 
vidualism", he said, called for a correction because ithad ignored the "life-world": "This ideological 
world is a world without families. It is also a world without neighbourhoods, ethnic communities, 
churches, cities, and towns, even nations (as opposed to states)" (p. 17). And the "life-world" consists 
- here the similarity to Dewey is surprising - of mutual communication. "The life-world missing in 
these ... ideologies is the place where we communicate with others, deliberate, come to agreements 
about standards and norms, pursue in common an effort to create a valuable form of life - in short, 
the lifeworld is the world of community" (p. 17). The good society is therefore, to put it more exactly, 
the good community, under the heading of "democratic communitarianism", which does admittedly 
acknowledge the sanctity of the individual but at the same time states that it can only be attained 
through the social context. Although, according to Bellah, the "face-to-face community" is important, 
and he would like to see it strengthened, democratic ommunitarianism is a concept hat can be 
applied to groupings of any size, "and ultimately to the world as a community" (p. 19). However, 
strictly speaking he overcomes communitarianism here and is confronted by similar problems, as 
will be shown here to exist in Dewey's work. 
9 Taylor (1989) was probably the first to draw attention to the difference, by separating ontolog- 
ical from normative questions: at the ontological level, communitarianism and republicanism share 
a holistic view of the world, whilst the communitarianists take sides with the community in the 
forefront and the republicans with the individual - a position which Taylor himself takes up. This 
differentiation was significantly expanded in later discussions, which are still going on today (Pettit, 
1993, 1997; Spitz, 1995). Although Dewey shares the ontological premises of both, he does not allow 
himself to be placed in either of these categories because for theoretical reasons he is not willing to 
give an unambiguous answer to the question of taking sides (see 3.3.). 
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10 Taylor, however, who in the face of communitarianism decides in favour of the republican alter- 
native to liberalism (see Footnote 9), is described by Ryan as being unconsciously a pupil of Dewey. 
"Charles Taylor, who is for the most part a Deweyan without knowing i t . . . "  (Ryan, 1995, p. 361). 
11 De Capitani reconstructs he history of republicanism as a freedom movement against he 
monarchies, primarily on the basis of the symbols and emblems from the time of the Roman republic 
through into the 18th century. The most important symbol, which later turned up on coins and coats- 
of-arms, was the pileus, or "cap of freedom", which was placed on the heads of slaves in Rome 
to show that they had been given their freedom. This symbol was later joined by the dagger with 
which Brutus murdered Caesar, and the facies as a symbol of unity (de Capitani, 1991 and 2000). 
This negative focus, however, applies only to the historical dimension, and looked at systematically 
republicanism stands for a positive definition of freedom because it means thereby the right of 
participation i  the business of government or, in modem republicanism, the right to delegate this 
participation torepresentatives. 
12 See also the fundamental thesis of John G.A. Pocock, 1979. 
13 "Primarily, a very small state in which the people can readily meet together and in which each 
citizen can easily know all the others" (3rd Book, 4th Chapter, (EC II1, p. 405). 
14 Rousseau's reference to Montesquieu relates to the following points in "The Spirit of Laws" 
(1748): "It does not take very much integrity for a monarchical or despotic government tomaintain 
or sustain itself. The force of the law on the one hand, the constantly raised arm of the prince on 
the other hand, govern or contain everything. However, in a people's tate, one additional resource is 
necessary: VIRTUE" (3rd Book, 3rd Chapter, (EC II, p. 251). Accordingly, the laws of different states 
are directed towards different aims. "In monarchies, (laws) have the aim of honour; in republics, 
virtue; in despocracies, fear" (4th Book, 1st Chapter, (EC II, p. 262). 
15 In "Democracy and Education", Dewey mainly uses the terms "community" and "society" 
synonymously, but is not yet working with the opposite term "Community" as in "Great Society". 
16 This designation is confusing in the sense that communitarianist criticism uses the terms "proce- 
dural iberalism" to describe the kind of liberalism itcriticises, and "procedural republic" to describe 
a state of this kind (see, for instance: Sandel, 1984). Honneth, in turn, simply calls this a "liberal 
political definition", which he sets up in opposition to the two "radical-democratic" models (pp. 37 
et seq.; see also note 2). 
17 This problem should not be confused with the programmatic problem to which both Westbrook 
(pp. 316 et seq.) and Kaufman-Osborn (1984) have drawn attention, amely the question of how the 
face-to-face communities are to be restored. The problem being discussed here is of afundarnental 
nature. 
18 Dewey's rejection of natural law makes it impossible to compare his theory with a current in 
republican thinking in the 18th century which developed republicanism on the basis of natural law in 
exactly the direction that Dewey was now taking as well: towards cosmopolitanism. The foundation 
of this is the human element that has to subjugate itself to love of one's own mother country, as Mably 
gave such prominence to in 1763: "This virtue, which is superior to love of one's own country, is the 
love of humanity" (p. 148). Similarly, the Basle state secretary Isaak Iselin wrote in 1764 of "base" 
patriotism, the driving forces of which are usually "ignorance, habit, and pride", which has to be 
distinguished from "the noble love of one's country", which is an "outpouring of the purest love of 
humanity" (1764a, pp. 138 et seq.). He also gained great attention with his work "On the History of 
Humanity", in which the future is described as follows: "Not until then will true freedom emerge 
as being infinitely more loveable than the apparent independence of the republicans in all their 
glory ... and then love, the only true virtue in any constitution, will pour out its blessed influences 
triumphantly over all sorts and conditions of men" (1764b, Volume 2, pp. 386 et seq.). 
19 Rockefeller's book pursues the thesis that Dewey's aim in life lay in this synthesis of science and 
faith (1991). 
20 It is surprising that, despite the predisposition of communitarianism for a theory of educa- 
tion, there are hardly any works that devote themselves to this subject. Individual chapters within 
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the standard works of communitarianism remain so totally on the surface that they can hardly be 
allowed to claim any relevance to educational science (see Etzioni, 1993, pp. 54-116; Bellah, 1991, 
pp. 145-178). The one exception is an essay by Helen Haste in which she starts from psychological 
prerequisites but goes no further (1996). 
21 Rousseau's concept of human education in "Emile" (1762) is a polemical attack on the situ- 
ation in which the political context still only permitted the education of the degenerate and corrupt 
bourgeoisie and not of the citoyen, the republican citizen. See Daniel Trthler, 1999. 
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